In this paper an encryption-decryption algorithm based on two moduli is described: one in the real field of integers and another in the field of complex integers. Also the proper selection of cryptographic system parameters is described. Several numeric illustrations explain step-by-step how to pre-condition a plaintext, how to select secret control parameters, how to ensure feasibility of all private keys and how to avoid ambiguity in the process of information recovery. The proposed public key cryptographic system is faster than most of known public key cryptosystems, since it requires a small number of multiplications and additions, and does not require exponentiations for its implementation.
Introduction and Primary Residues
This paper describes and briefly analyzes a public key cryptographic (PKC) based on primary residues and Gaussian modulus. The framework of the proposed PKC partially resembles NTRU PKC [1, 2] {more details are provided in www.ntru.com} that was introduced in 1996 and later patented by three mathematicians from Brown University. Their PKC was analyzed in several papers [3] [4] [5] : in [3] it was pointed out that the decryption did not always recover the initial plaintext. Nevertheless, the NTRU had such a computational appeal that its authors were granted a USA patent even before the flaws in the algorithm were eliminated. Papers [4, 5] provided several scenarios of cryptanalysis of the NTRU.
In this paper we consider a public key cryptographic system with two modulo reductions:
• Real integer modulus n and • Complex (Gaussian) modulus R [6] .
As a result, all public and private keys of each user and secret controls S are also Gaussians. Since plaintext blocks are also Gaussian, to avoid ambiguity in information recovery a concept of primary residues is introduced. It is demonstrated how to ensure that all keys of the proposed cryptosystem provide unambiguous recovery of initially pre-conditioned and subsequently-encrypted information.
In the proposed cryptosystem there is no necessity to consider polynomials with binary coefficients as it is done in papers [1] and [2] .
Complex Modulo Reduction
Real modulus: In a group based on real modulo reduction n there are two results, whether n is either prime or composite: if mod 0 a n b   , then mod 0 a n b n    is also correct.
In order to avoid ambiguity, we can stipulate that only non-negative results are feasible.
Complex modulus: Consider Gaussian integers   are also correct. In order to avoid ambiguity in this case, it is stipulated in this paper that only primary residues are feasible {a definition and details are provided below}. Let's define the norm N of R as 
In the cryptographic scheme described below a plaintext M is divided onto pairs of blocks 
Geometric Interpretation
All primary residues are located inside a tilted square 
Cryptographic System Based on Primary Residues
1) All users (i = 1, 2, ···) agree to select a large real integer n {the same for all of them};
2) The i-th user has private and public keys, and secret controls , , , ,
P R U Q S with index i; {in the forthcoming discussion index i is omitted for the sake of simplicity of notations};
3) Variables: P, R, U, Q, S, F, W, where each of them is a complex (Gaussian) integer; 4) User's private keys:
where R is also a Gaussian prime and
{the second condition in (2.1) holds if R is a Gaussian prime}; Remark 2.1: The stipulation that R is a Gaussian prime is sufficient to assure that certain conditions hold, but not necessary. Hence, it can be omitted under other considerations.
5) Every user pre-computes inverse
6) Every user pre-computes her/his public key
Every user pre-computes a multiplicative inverse Q of P modulo Gaussian prime R:
As demonstrated in [7] , P has multiplicative inverse modulo R even if
Therefore, if R is a Gaussian prime, then every Gaussian is co-prime with R, i.e., it has a multiplicative inverse modulo R. Primality of R is sufficient, but not necessary condition. The algorithm for computation of Q in (2.5) is provided below in Section 9.
Remark 2.4: Condition (1.13) is not directly verifiable by a sender since R is the private key of the receiver. Yet, the sender has an option to indirectly satisfy (1.13 
Hiding Information and Its Recovery

Threshold Parameter
Suppose that a sender (Sam) transmits a plaintext message   and plaintext M must be a primary residue modulo R {see (1.8-1.13)}. Here variable u (threshold) is the same for all users; its value is established below.
Sender's Secret Key
For security reason, the sender periodically selects a randomized secret key   
Decryption: {requires real and Gaussian modulo reductions}:
Stage 1 {Real modulo n reduction}:
Stage 2 {Gaussian modulo R reduction}:
Algorithm for Multiplicative Inverse of P Modulo Complex R
The algorithm computes the user's private key
If R is a Gaussian prime, then
.
Computation (3.6) of multiplicative inverse (3.5) is based on the following identity. Finally, the latter equality in (4.4) holds since W is a primary residue modulo R ( 1.5) 
Validation of Encryption-Decryption Algorithm
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Cryptosystem Design
Inputs m 1 and m 2 are independent variables known only to the sender (Sam). There are two types of variables: long-term static system parameters (strategic variables) and short-term dynamic controls (tactical variables): System parameter n; Strategic variables P and R; Dynamic controls S; and Observable inputs:
Here it is assumed that plaintext   1 2 , w w is already preconditioned; {more details are provided below}.
In addition, every W must be a primary residue for the receiver, i.e., W and modulus R for every user must satisfy the following system of inequalities with eight integer variables: 
Numeric Illustrations
Let n = 10006001; the user's private keys P, Q, R and public key U are listed in Table 1 . Here
 
2291, 2180 10001081; P    P is a primary residue modulo R; R = 10006109; and feasibility threshold parameters are equal: u = 6 n = 1291; and 2u = 2 3 n = 2582. In Table 2 every block of plaintext W is primary residue of R, and the following constraints are satisfied:
Notice that for each of five blocks W we considered different secret controls S. Remark 9.1: The inverse of P can be also computed via solution of a Diophantine equation, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.
Algorithm for Multiplicative Inverse of
Computational Complexity
Encryption of each W requires three multiplications and five additions of real integers.
Decryption requires twice as many of these operations. Since addition/subtractions are much faster than multi-plications, they can be neglected [8] . Therefore, we need nine multiplication of   log 2 n -digit long integers, which means that bit-wise complexity is of order   2 log n  . This complexity can be reduced if we apply more elaborate algorithms for multiplication of multidigit long real integers [9, 10] .
Conclusions
In this paper an encryption-decryption algorithm based on real and complex modulo reductions is considered and analyzed. A concept of primary residues is introduced to avoid ambiguity in information recovery. Several numeric illustrations explain step-by-step how to pre-condition a plaintext, how to select public and private keys for every user, and how to select secret controls for every block of the plaintext in order to ensure unambiguous recovery of the initial information. The proposed cryptosystem requires a small number of multiplications and additions, and as a result, it is extremely fast. Although certain steps in the proposed cryptosystem resemble the NTRU cryptosystem, yet it differs from the NTRU in many features. One of them is absence of polynomials. In paper [8] is provided a brief history on the NTRU, which is reiterated below. The NTRU that was initially presented at Crypto '96 was cryptanalyzed and broken in [11] by the method of lattice-basis reduction methods [12] that determines short vectors in a lattice, which arise on the decryption stage. Soon after that in papers [13] and [14] were described two other successful attempts to break the NTRU. An NTRU signature scheme was proposed in [15] , but that scheme and its revision were broken in [16] and [17] .
